Are Elections in Brazil Safe?

 



How electronic voting machines work, what security mechanisms are in place, and what audits reveal about the reliability of Brazil's electoral system.


During Brazil's 2026 presidential elections, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), the defeated second-round candidate, once again questioned the reliability of the country's electoral system. In a letter released after his defeat, he claimed that the elections had been rigged, but presented no technical evidence to support the accusation.


The statement attracted even greater attention when Rogério Marinho (PL-RN), Flávio's campaign coordinator, publicly acknowledged that there was no evidence to support the allegation.


The controversy also emerged at a time when Flávio Bolsonaro was the subject of two criminal investigations at Brazil's Supreme Federal Court. One concerns payments and financial resources related to the production of Dark Horse, a film about his father's political career. The other involves allegations of money laundering connected to business dealings involving betting platforms and lawyer Willer Tomaz. It is important to emphasize that investigations do not constitute convictions, and the senator denies any wrongdoing.


Against this background, several questions inevitably arise: Are Brazilian elections actually safe? How does the electronic voting system work? Is it possible to alter votes? Who oversees the voting machines? And what mechanisms exist to identify potential fraud?


To answer these questions, we must set aside partisan disputes and examine the documents, technical procedures, audits, and oversight mechanisms that are part of Brazil's electoral process.


 1. The History of Electronic Voting Machines in Brazil


Brazil began using electronic voting machines in the 1996 municipal elections. At that time, approximately 32 million voters had access to the new system. Its use was gradually expanded until it covered the entire electorate in the 2000 elections.


This change represented a significant transformation in the way votes were recorded and counted.


Previously, vote counting depended on manually counting paper ballots, a time-consuming procedure vulnerable to human error, operational problems, and potential irregularities during ballot handling.


With the introduction of electronic voting, counting became automated, reducing the time required to determine election results and eliminating certain vulnerabilities associated with manual counting.


Since then, the system has undergone numerous technological updates and improvements to its security procedures.


2. The Voting Machines Are Not Connected to the Internet


One of the most important characteristics of Brazil's electronic voting machines is that they do not operate like conventional computers connected to the internet.


During preparation, voting, and the closing of polling stations, the machines are not connected to external communication networks.


This means that a hacker anywhere in the world cannot simply access a voting machine through the internet and modify its recorded votes.


But how do the results reach the Superior Electoral Court (TSE)?


After voting ends, the data is transmitted through the Electoral Court's dedicated infrastructure, using a private network and mechanisms designed to verify the authenticity and integrity of the files.


The files undergo digital signature verification, allowing their origin to be confirmed and unauthorized alterations to be identified.


It is therefore important to distinguish between two things: the voting machine itself does not need to be connected to the internet to transmit results, since transmission takes place through specific equipment and procedures within the electoral infrastructure.


This isolation significantly reduces the possibility of remote attacks during voting.


3. What Prevents Votes from Being Altered?


Security does not depend solely on keeping voting machines isolated. Technological mechanisms are also in place to prevent unauthorized modifications to electoral software and files.


These include:


- Digital signatures for official software.

- Verification of the authenticity of installed systems.

- Access controls for voting equipment.

- Procedures for preparing and sealing voting machines.

- Digital records and oversight mechanisms.

- Verification of the integrity of transmitted files.


Before elections, the software used in the voting process undergoes inspection and oversight procedures.


Authorized institutions can monitor stages of system preparation and examine the source code made available by the Electoral Court.


This is important because security should not depend exclusively on trusting the organization that develops or administers the system. It must also allow other institutions to examine its procedures.


4. The Public Security Test: When Experts Try to Find Vulnerabilities


One of the most interesting features of Brazil's electoral system is the Public Security Test (TPS), conducted by the TSE since 2009.


This initiative allows specialists in technology, information security, and programming to attempt to identify vulnerabilities in electoral systems.


Instead of simply claiming that voting machines are secure, the Electoral Court opens certain components of the system to researchers so they can look for potential weaknesses.


The objective is to identify problems before elections, allowing them to be corrected.


During the edition held from December 1 to 5, 2025, 35 attack plans were proposed. Of these, 29 were carried out, and four produced technical findings.


None of these findings compromised ballot secrecy, the integrity of voting records, or election results.


Furthermore, improvements made by the TSE were subsequently subjected to a Confirmation Test, held from May 13 to 15, 2026, with the participation of the original investigators.


This procedure demonstrates something fundamental: identifying a potential vulnerability does not necessarily mean that an election has been compromised.


In fact, identifying and correcting weaknesses is precisely one of the purposes of security testing.


A reliable system does not need to be presented as infallible. It needs mechanisms to identify problems, correct them, and verify that the solutions work.


5. The Integrity Test: Comparing Electronic Votes with Paper Ballots


Another important mechanism is the Integrity Test, which has been used since 2002.


This procedure makes it possible to compare votes recorded on paper ballots with the results displayed by electronic voting machines.


The process is relatively straightforward:


1. On the day before the election, voting machines are publicly selected by lottery to participate in the audit.

2. Simulated votes are prepared on paper ballots.

3. On election day, the votes on these ballots are read and entered into the selected voting machines.

4. At the end, the electronic results are compared with the physical ballot count.


The entire procedure is monitored by inspectors and representatives of participating institutions, and it is also recorded on video.


If 100 votes for a particular candidate were entered from the paper ballots, the audited voting machine must display exactly the same 100 votes in its final results.


The purpose is to verify whether the equipment correctly records and counts the votes entered into it.


According to information released by the TSE, since the procedure was introduced, no discrepancies have been recorded between the results of the paper ballots used in the test and the results displayed by the audited machines.


This is one of the most concrete ways to verify that the equipment is functioning correctly.


6. The Ballot Box Report: Any Citizen Can Check the Results


At the end of voting, each electronic voting machine produces a document known as the Ballot Box Report (Boletim de Urna, or BU).


This document provides information such as:


- Identification of the polling station.

- Number of voters who cast ballots.

- Number of votes recorded for each candidate.

- Blank and invalid votes.

- Other information related to the closing of the voting session.


This report is fundamental to electoral transparency.


It allows the results from each individual polling station to be compared with the figures officially published by the Electoral Court.


Political parties, election inspectors, and citizens can access these documents and verify whether the data matches the published results.


In addition, voters can use the Boletim na Mão application, provided by the Electoral Court, to access the reports through their QR codes.


Therefore, the vote count does not simply depend on believing a number announced by the TSE. Documents produced at the polling stations themselves make it possible to verify the results.


7. Brazil's Federal Court of Accounts Also Audited the Voting Machines


One particularly important point is that oversight is not limited to the institution responsible for administering elections.


Brazil's Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) conducted a comprehensive audit of the electronic voting system between 2021 and 2023.


The audit examined different stages of the process, including information security, equipment preparation, voting, data transmission, and the final consolidation of results.


During the 2022 elections, TCU teams monitored procedures in person and checked 1,163 ballot box reports across the first and second rounds.


At another stage, data from 4,577 polling stations was analyzed, involving the cross-checking of approximately 6.3 million pieces of information.


The results were favorable regarding the system's reliability. The court confirmed the existence of oversight and auditing mechanisms and reaffirmed the security of the electoral process.


However, it also issued recommendations to improve information security procedures, communication, and oversight.


This detail deserves attention: a serious audit does not need to claim that everything is perfect. Its purpose is to identify what works, point out risks, and recommend improvements.


8. What About International Observers?


The reliability of Brazil's elections has also been monitored by international organizations.


During the 2022 general elections, the Organization of American States (OAS) sent an Electoral Observation Mission that monitored different stages of the process.


Following the second round, the organization highlighted the professionalism and soundness of the work carried out by Brazil's Electoral Court, despite an environment marked by political polarization, misinformation, and attacks on electoral institutions.


The mission included experts from different nationalities who monitored aspects related to election organization, electoral technology, voting, and vote counting.


International monitoring is important because it allows external observers to examine how Brazilian institutions operate.


Naturally, international observation does not replace technical audits. Nevertheless, it adds another layer of independent oversight to the process.


9. Is It Impossible to Commit Fraud Using Electronic Voting Machines?


Here, we need to be technically honest.


No computerized system can be considered absolutely invulnerable. This applies to banks, companies, governments, hospitals, and even the world's largest technology companies.


Therefore, claiming that fraud would be mathematically impossible would be an exaggeration.


The truly important question is different: Are there mechanisms capable of preventing, detecting, and investigating attempts at fraud?


In Brazil, there are several layers of protection and oversight, including the isolation of voting machines, software verification, public security tests, digital signatures, ballot box reports, and audits.


An attempt to manipulate the system could leave evidence at different stages of the process, depending on the nature of the irregularity.


That is why allegations of fraud must be supported by verifiable technical evidence.


A voting machine malfunction, the replacement of equipment, or difficulties transmitting data do not, by themselves, constitute evidence that votes were altered.


Likewise, the existence of a potential vulnerability identified in a laboratory does not mean that it was exploited during an election.


It is necessary to demonstrate what happened, how it happened, and which results were actually compromised.


10. The Central Issue: Distrust Is Not Evidence


Democracy allows questions, criticism, and oversight of institutions. No court should be beyond scrutiny.


However, there is a fundamental difference between questioning a system and claiming that fraud occurred.


An accusation of this magnitude requires evidence.


In the 2026 elections, Flávio Bolsonaro's statement attracted considerable attention, but his own campaign coordinator publicly acknowledged that there was no evidence to support the accusation.


Furthermore, the candidate's party acknowledged the election result.


This does not mean that every question about the electoral process should automatically be dismissed. It means that allegations must be examined in light of documents, audits, and concrete evidence, rather than political statements alone.


Trust in elections should not depend on the identity of the winner or loser. It should depend on whether the procedures and results can be independently verified.


Conclusion: Election Security Is an Ongoing Responsibility


Brazil's electronic voting machines have a security framework involving different technological protections and oversight procedures.


The isolation of voting machines from external networks, digital signatures, public security tests, the Integrity Test, ballot box reports, and audits conducted by the Federal Court of Accounts are examples of mechanisms that make it possible to verify how the system operates.


The existence of these mechanisms does not mean that the technology is infallible or that there are no opportunities for improvement. It means that concrete procedures exist to monitor the system, identify problems, and investigate potential irregularities.


Democracy does not require citizens to have blind faith in institutions. It requires institutions to be transparent, open to scrutiny, and accountable for their actions.


And perhaps this is the most important point: if someone claims that millions of votes were fraudulent, they must provide evidence that matches the seriousness of the accusation.


Losing an election, disagreeing with the outcome, or distrusting an institution is not enough to turn suspicion into fact.


The vote belongs to the citizen. Ensuring that the citizen's will is respected is an institutional, technical, and democratic responsibility, regardless of who wins the election.*



Sources and documents for reference

* [Agência Brasil – Rogério Marinho acknowledges the lack of evidence of electoral fraud](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2026-10/rogerio-marinho-diz-que-nao-ha-provas-de-fraude-eleitoral?


* [Agência Brasil – Investigations involving Flávio Bolsonaro](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/entenda-investigacoes-contra-flavio-continuam-no-stf-apos-fuga?


* [TSE – Secure Voting](https://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/historia/processo-eleitoral-brasileiro/votacao/votacao-segura?


* [TSE – Public Security Test 2025](https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/fato-ou-boato/checagens/2026/urna-eletronica-nao-foi-invadida-por-hackers-durante-teste-publico-de-seguranca-do-tse?


* [TSE – How the Integrity Test Works](https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/como-funciona-o-teste-de-integridade-a-prova-dos-nove-da-urna-eletronica?


* [TCU – Audit of Brazil's Electoral System](https://portal.tcu.gov.br/imprensa/noticias/tcu-completa-auditoria-no-sistema-eleitoral-brasileiro?


* [OAS – Report of the 2022 Electoral Observation Mission](https://www.oas.org/pt/centro_midia/nota_imprensa.asp?sCodigo=DP-023%2F22


Article updated November 2, 2026. The investigations mentioned do not constitute convictions. Information concerning security tests and audits is attributed to the institutions responsible.


Article updated November 2, 2026. The investigations mentioned do not constitute convictions. Information concerning security tests and audits is attributed to the institutions responsible.


Comments